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Abstract—Websites use third-party ads and tracking services
to deliver targeted ads and collect information about users that
visit them. These services put users privacy at risk and that’s
why users demand to block these services is growing. Most of
the blocking solutions rely on crowd-sourced filter lists that are
built and maintained manually by a large community of users.
In this work, we seek to simplify the update of these filter
lists by automatic detection of hidden advertisements. Existing
tracker detection approaches generally focus on each individual
website’s URL patterns, code structure and/or DOM structure of
website. Our work differs from existing approaches by combining
different websites through a large scale graph connecting all
resource requests made over a large set of sites. This graph is
thereafter used to train a machine learning model, through graph
representation learning to detect ads and tracking resources. As
our approach combines different sources of information, it is
more robust toward evasion techniques that use obfuscation or
change usage patterns. We evaluate our work over the Alexa
top-10K websites, and find its accuracy to be 90.9% also it can
block new ads and tracking services which would necessitate to
be blocked further crowd-sourced existing filter lists. Moreover,
the approach followed in this paper sheds light on the ecosystem
of third party tracking and advertising.
I. INTRODUCTION
The underlying business model of Internet growth that is
mainly based on free access to online resources has driven a
full industry of targeted advertisements that generate revenue
for the content providers. These advertisements are delivered
through online services that we name first-party throughout
the paper. These advertisement and related services are often
served in the form of scripts and sub-documents, i.e., Iframes,
that are inserted in web pages in order to provide customized
ads or to provide web analytics [29]. These tracking services
track users’ behavior in order to generate for the user cus-
tomised ads, but at the cost of users’ privacy.
In recent years, many researches engaged in preserving
user’s privacy by analyzing the ads and tracking ecosystem
∗This research was supported by the Institute for Artificial Intelligence
(iai.iut.ac.ir) under a generous grant by Mr. Farhad Rahnema.
[8]. Several ad-blocking tools, such as Ghostery [19], No
Script [35], Adblock [1], Adblock Plus [2], Disconnect [9],
and Privacy Badger [37] have been developed. According to
PageFair, more than 700 million people were using adblockers
at the end of 2019 [36]. These tools generally leverage filter
lists that are usually created by a community of users [47]. As
trackers change frequently their behavior to evade detection
techniques and develop continuously new tracking technique,
the filter lists and rulesets used for detecting trackers and
advertiser have to be regularly updated to remain effective.
Moreover, sites in specific geographic and linguistic area might
have less frequent trackers that are not reported in popular
adblock lists [14], [21], [41], [44].
Let’s illustrate the issues by looking at latercera.com, the
website of a daily newspaper in Chile. When opening this
site the browser downloads many objects, e.g. images, videos,
documents, and scripts, that belongs either to first (the news-
paper itself) or third-parties (e.g. advertisers, tracker and web
analytic services). It is also likely that some of these objects
load other related objects. One can find on latercera.com
website more than 50 third-party services, many of them being
uploaded by a small number of third-parties object that are
directly inserted into the source code of the website. We will
call in the forthcoming these indirect third-parties bounced
third parties. We show in Fig. 1 some of the third-parties
observed at latercera.com site and their relations.
Fig. 1 shows that three major third parties {doubleclick.net,
googletagmanager.com, googlesyndication.com} introduce
most of other third-parties. While popular filter lists (such as
EasyList [11] and EasyPrivacy [12]) can be used to block
most of these trackers, but the two services hashed in Fig. 1,
{sparkflow.net, adledge.com} are not blocked individually as
there does not exist any rule relative to them.
Updating filter lists entails detecting and labelling the un-
known third-party service as ad/tracker and inserting novel
rules in filter lists. Some features can be used to separate ad
or tracker services from more innocuous services. The first
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Fig. 1: The graph relative to third-parties communications in
latercera.com. In this graph, nodes that depend of other node
are linked via a directed edge.
feature is the observation rate among different websites, i.e.,
third-party trackers are generally observed in several websites.
Indeed the issue there is to choose a significant number of
appearance for detecting a tracker. The second feature is the
web of relationships among third parties. Trackers interact
with each others in order to grow their business and access
to more data. One can leverage these interaction in order
to detect trackers. The last feature is the specific behaviors
of trackers. In particular, trackers have to send the collected
information to their servers, generating traces that can be used
to identify them. By combining these features, we can detect
trackers. However, extracting these feature needs large-scale
data collection and analysis.
There has been significant prior works on automating
tracker detection and updating filter lists. These previous
works either do not cover all websites objects, e.g., only
JavaScripts or HTTP requests are exploited [7], [20], [23],
[27], [48], [51], [10], or they do not look at multiple websites
and they make decision solely based on the objects in each
individual website [26], [8], [41]. Usually, models trained
separately over each single website, might see a given tracker
several times during the training or testing phase, generating
biases for frequently seen trackers. However, in our work we
are using each tracker service only one time, even if it is
repeated in several websites, reducing the bias.
In this paper we develop an approach based on a single
large web graph capturing dependencies between trackers.
This graph is expanded during the crawling of websites by
adding new observed third-parties. This is web graph is used
in order to detect and label new trackers by a supervised
machine learning model. The contributions in this paper can
be summarized as follows:
1) We define a directed graph, named wide dependency
chain graph (WideGraph), that models relation between
third party services over the whole crawling history.
WideGraph node consists of different types of objects:
scripts, Iframes, and requests, etc., observed during the
websites crawl. Two nodes are connected if the source
node invokes the destination node, e.g., a website node
is connected to a third party node if the third party is
called directly in the website page code.
2) We apply to the WideGraph a new and modified graph
representation learning algorithm that targets auto-
matic extraction of tracker features.
3) We also develop an effective method for extracting
keywords that extracts the most useful keywords from
the URL requests and assigns a weight to it based
on its relative frequency in other tracker URLs. These
keywords along with their weights can be used to refine
trackers detection.
4) Finally we develop a supervised machine learning
classifier that get two category of inputs : structural
properties, i.e. the WideGraph, node relations and con-
tent based features, ı.e. keywords and their weights.
We show that after training, the Random Forest model
can retrieve with 96.1% biased and 90.9% unbiased
accuracy, labels assigned by existing filter list and we
moreover uncover more new trackers that were unre-
ported.
In the forthcoming we will address advertisement and
tracker services as ”AdTrackers” as it is frequently difficult
to separate this two roles and we are aiming into detecting
both.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we introduce our methodology and the needed background.
In section III, we nominate our classification model. In
Section IV, we present the results of our experiments. In
Section V, we relate our work to state-of-the art in the field.
Finally, we give our final remarks in Section VI.
II. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we present needed background and our
methodology to identify third-party trackers. We show in Fig. 2
a summary of the methodology.
A. Background
A user connecting to a website provides a lot of information
that might be considered as private, like IP address, browser
parameters, etc., that even enable to identify the user through
fingerprinting [34], but are nonetheless needed for operational
purpose of getting connected top the website. However, this
generate a privacy problem when the website (first-party),
exchange some of these information, or give access to some
details of user connection. This access can be done consciously
by the first party to gather some benefit from advertisement,
or unconsciously by embedding third-party services that might
be beneficial to the user or the content provider. By harvesting
information from a large number of individual websites, the
”personal data” industry can gather fine grain and precise
information about the users that enable them to profile the
user and to jeopardize their privacy [5], [13], [29], security
[18], [30], [32], users satisfaction [36] and performance [17],
[38]. We show in Fig. 3 how third party trackers generate
ads targeted to each visitor. Trackers can harvest information
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Fig. 2: Methodology overview: (a) Dataset collection from the top 10k Alexa websites and dependency chain extraction, (b)
Dependency chains merging, (c) WideGraph extraction, (d) Machine learning training and classification of sub-domains into
two class of ”ad/tracker” and ”non-ad/tracker”.
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Fig. 3: Targeted ad mechanism : every time a user opens a
website, the browser makes, along with the request to the web
server, several other requests other servers that inform them
of the visit of the user. By gathering these information the
advertiser generate a profile for the user and propose him a
targeted ad.
through different means. However, Javascripts and Iframes are
frequently used because of ease of placement in first-party
codes. An added script from a third party might only contact
its home server, or it might connect to several other third
parties, bounced one, and transfer them information, i.e., a
JavaScript from a third party might load additional JavaScript
coming from other third parties. These later connections are
more difficult to detect and to address as they are not directly
seen in the first party code. The calling relationship among
downloaded objects creates a dependency chain among objects
in a web session [24]. For example in Fig. 4-b we show this
dependency chain for a website as directed edge in a graph.
As we highlighted in this figure the web page contains a
JavaScript from Domain 5 that loads three other JavaScripts
from domains 3, 4, and 6, and the JavaScript from domain 4
makes a request to the domain 4 server.
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Fig. 4: bipartite graph VS Dependency chain graph: Each node
represents a unique domain in this figure. a) in a bipartite graph
all third-party services are connected by nodes connected root.
b) in dependency chain each edge represents a calling relation,
source node has called destination node.
Adblockers are effective methods to block trackers. They
use filter lists that help in detecting and removing unwanted
contents in web pages. The filter lists define a set of rules
that might be based on keyword or specific patterns. However,
these list have to be updated frequently to adapt to behavior
change of trackers that find themselves on filter lists [25].
Another relevant dimension is that in order to detect ads,
adblockers have to check a large number of rules, resulting in
increased load on the user computer and in large delay [46].
Therefore filter list have also to be regularly purged from non-
pertinent rules that slow the browsing experience. All these
element point toward to importance of developing automated
methods for detecting tracker and managing filter list in an
efficient way.
3
B. Dataset
We used the sites in the top 10K lists of Alexa , showing
the 10K websites with the highest number of visit [4]. We
used an instrumented Chromium browser controlled with the
Selenium [40] browser automation tool. This tool enables us to
automate web-based tasks, especially crawling jobs. We used
this instrumented browser to visit each of the 10K websites
and to collect all web browser’s interaction, i.e., URLs, script
or objects fetched by the browser).
During these crawling experiences we observed that tracker
objects are both injected offline, i.e. embedded into web page
code, and online, i.e. generated in real-time by another object,
e.g., JavaScript or active servers. The online method is used
in order to prevent the tracker from being easily detected
by adblockers. The online and active generation of trackers
make mandatory to implement a dynamic analysis of web
browsing in order to find all trackers. For this purpose we
used a feature of the Chromium’s developer tools. Chromium is
able to store the HTTP transactions between user and browser
in an archival format named har Format [33]. In har format,
each requested object has an ”initiator” element, that describe
the web resource that have initiated the requested object. In
other terms, when we load a web page, all requests, e.g.,
XMLHTTP, Style Sheets (CSS), Scripts (Javascrips), Iframes,
Medias (e.g., images and videos) will be stored in the har
archive with a labelled initiator. We also set the timeouts for
the web driver of Chromium to be large enough to download
an render completely all elements of the page and to avoid
stalled crawls. In our final dataset, we attained a downloads
success rate of 84% for all elements of the top 10K Alexa
websites.
C. Graph Construction
After obtaining the har archive relative to a website con-
nection, we first gather all URLs involved in the web session.
For each URL, the har archive also contains its corresponding
“initiator” element which has requested the download of that
URL. Therefore, for each website, we can characterize a
dependency chain in which initiating objects within the source
URL (the website’s URL) are linked towards their requested
URLs to be downloaded. Initiating objects can take different
forms: JavaScript, Media (Images, Videos), Iframes, or other
types of requests, e.g. XMLHTTP requests. For each first
party’s website, we regroup those URLs with the same domain
as that of the first party website into one node 1. This (super)
node indeed represents the whole objects belonging to the first
party website. We call this regrouping procedure as the path
contraction step. From this first party domain, there are several
links that connect it to third parties. The interaction with the
third parties can take different forms. In this paper we consider
4 different types of interactions, namely, the Javascript,
the Media, the Iframe, and the Other. Accordingly, for
each third party domain, we maintain up to 4 nodes, each
1 We have used the tldextract tool to extract the top level (main) domain
of URLs [45].
representing one of the interaction types. Therefore, a URL,
belonging to a particular third party domain, links the first
party domain hosting its initiating element to one of the 4
nodes of that third party. Furthermore, inside each third party
node, we maintain several “documents”, each for a particular
sub-domain of that third party, as information elements that
resort the content of the incoming URLs. These are these
documents that finally get classified into tracker or non-tracker
categories. Until now, for each given first party website, we
can consider a directed tree rooted from the node labeled with
the first party’s domain and branches to third parties’ nodes,
each labeled with the corresponding third party’s domain name
and the type of interaction that leads to this node. In order to
not loose the relationship between first party domain (root) and
nodes that are not directly connected to it, i.e bounced third
parties, we add virtual edges connecting the root to bounced
third party domains and label them with Bounced. We call
this last step edge expansion.
After constructing trees for individual first parties’ websites,
we fusion all trees into a single graph. This graph is obtained
by merging third party nodes (and their nested documents) in
different trees that have the same domain and same interaction
labels. This means that two third party nodes with the same
domain and interaction label get merged into a single node
but with the edge set that is the union of the two pre-fusion
edge sets. It should be noted that sub-domain documents inside
each of a third party’s nodes, after the fusion, are also updated
to resort the information of all incoming edges (URLs). The
resulting merged graph is called the ”WideGraph”. We show
all steps involved in building the WideGraph in Fig. 5.
WideGraph have some interesting properties: -First Wide-
Graph combines all information relative to third parties
ecosystem into a single and holistic graph representation.
Third party nodes capture all the observed interactions as
well as all information captured by the third parties. We will
see later the major advantage of this representation when
it comes to detecting tracker third parties. -Second, each
type of interaction of a third party domain appears at most
once in the WideGraph. The number of outgoing edges of
a first party represents the number of third parties that are
contacted when a user get to this domain. Some of these
third parties are contacted directly while some are contacted
through intermediaries. The number of incoming edges to a
third party node (only third parties have incoming edges),
represents how many other domains send information to it.
We define for each third party a ”direct coverage” value
that represents the percentage of first party nodes that are
connected directly to it through an edge with label Bounced,
and an ”indirect coverage” value that represents the percentage
of first party nodes that have a path connecting them to this
third party. The direct coverage shows the proportion of first
party sites where the third party can track a user through
direct information transfer and the indirect coverage shows the
potential portion of first party sites where the the third party
can track the user. Another metric of interest is also the average
path length between first party and third parties. -Third, There
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are attributes for each node obtained from the edges connected
to it. The node attribute of a particular node in the WideGraph
is the aggregation of URLs, which have the same domain
and interaction label of that node. As mentioned before, these
attributes are grouped into documents based on the sub-domain
of that node and allow us to extract strong content features
from it. -Forth, Each sub-domain of a particular third party
which has been initiated by a certain type of initiator (JS,
Iframe, Media, or Other) is modeled as a document inside one
of the nodes pertaining to that third party domain. As a result,
each type-specified sub-domain has both structural (graph-
based) features as it resides inside a node in the WideGraph
and content features as all the information in the corresponding
URLs are saved in its corresponding document. The reason
for this approach of characterizing type-specific sub-domains
is that some tracker companies generate different sub-domains
for each costumer (as a kind of costumer’s id). For example
marketo.com (an Adobe company) requests follow this URL
format: {munchkin-id}.mktoresp.com. As a result, modeling
sub-domains with individual nodes may mislead the structural
features. For example, we expect that nodes which should be
considered to be a tracker, and hence, blocked, are among
high degree nodes while it is not the case for companies
which use sub-domains as customers’ id. on the other hand,
a company may offer different services on different domains
and some of them are trackers and should be block and some
of them are not. For example, consider two services of google
company: adservice.google.com which should be blocked, and
translate.google.com which should not be blocked. Therefore,
our approach to treat sub-domains separately in the form of
“documents inside third parties’ nodes” allows us to both
preserve important graph based features and classify services
based on sub-domains.
It is noteworthy that WideGraph is not the first attempt
to build a graph out of web sessions. Lightbeam [31] was
a browser’s extension that generates and shows graphs of
third-parties. However the graph they build, was a bipartite
graph, first parties on one side and third parties on the other
side, with only links between first and third parties, while the
WideGraph contains more complete information with links
between third parties. Fig. 4 shows the difference between
dependency chains that we use and the star bipartite graph
generated by Lightbeam and Disconnect, among others.
D. Feature Extraction
The next step is features extraction from the WideGraph. We
focused on two types of features: ”Structural features”, which
are obtained over the WideGraph and represents relationship
between nodes in the graph, and ”Content features” that only
depend of the individual interaction made between nodes. In
the forthcoming we will describe them both.
1) Structural Features: We extracted for each node in the
WideGraph, some structural features. For calculating these
features we used the Refex algorithm [22]. This algorithm uses
a recursive procedure to extract features from basic features. It
basically uses three simple graph properties per node, which
are the degree of the node, the ”ego interconnectivity”, i.e., the
number of edges interconnecting direct node neighbors, and
the ”ego out-degree”, i.e., the number of edges connecting
neighbors to other parts of the graph.
In our approach to extract graph-based features, we adopted
Refex in the same way but append more basic features for
each of nodes including in and out-degrees, direct and indirect
coverage. Furthermore, in our implementation, we used a
5
pruning function that evaluates correlation between features
and drops features with high correlation.
2) Content Features: Content features are obtained by
looking at individual interactions between nodes in the Wide-
Graph. Trackers usually use XMLHTTP Requests for sending
profile and tracking information to their server. These requests
generally follow typical patterns that makes them easy to
detect. These patterns are the one used generally by adblockers
to filter trackers.
We have considered two types of features to extract from in-
dividual interactions for each potential adblocker sub-domain:
”engineered features”, and ”keywords”. The engineered fea-
tures are four basic metrics that are common in most of
trackers, like the URL lengths (that is generally large for
AdTrackers), the number of repetition of special keys like ”&”,
”=” or ”?,” that are used to delimit values that are uploaded
to AdTracker servers. We also add the type of nodes,e.g., Js,
Iframe, etc., as an engineered feature.
Adblockers usually use precisely tuned ”keywords” to detect
trackers. Choosing, a set of effective keywords plays a critical
role in the performance of tracker detection. We developed an
automated way of extracting efficient keywords that uses the
well-know Term FrequencyInverse Document Frequency (TF-
IDF) statistics [39]. This metric is frequently used to evaluate
how important a keyword is to a document in a collection.
The TF-IDF score for a term t in a document d in a collection
of documents D is defined as :
TFIDF(t, d,D) = log(1 + ft,d) · log
(
|D|
1+|(d∈D:t∈d)|
)
,
where ft,d is the number of times that term t occurs in the
document d. |D| is the number of documents and |(d ∈ D :
t ∈ d) is the number of document that contains the term t. So
we first look at all potentially third-party AdTracker URL and
apply a tokenizer splitting the URLs through ”/”, ”?”, ”&”,
”=”, ”.” and ”-” characters and extracts potential keyword. We
derived for each potential keyword extracted by the tokenizer
it TF-IDF assuming that aggregation of URLs of a sub-domain
is a separate document. We only saved the 1000 most frequent
keywords and use them as a content feature vector. For each
sub-domain this vector is a sparse vector with the TF-IDF
value for keywords appearing in the URL and 0 elsewhere.
III. CLASSIFICATION
The aim of our approach is to develop a classifier that given
”structural”, ”engineered” and ”content” features extracted
from an given sub-domain is predicting if the sub-domain is
a AdTrackers or rather a benign.
A. Models
We tested two methods for building this classifier: a Deep
Neural Network, and a Random Forest model. As the results of
the Random Forest are slightly better and that Random Forest
is more easy to implement into a fast classifier, we only report
here only the results of the Random Forest model.
Random Forest consists of a number of decision trees that
are applied over given features and give the classification
outcome at its leafs. In our Random Forest fitting we used
averaging to improve accuracy and reduce over fitting. We
have used a Random Forest model with 250 trees.
B. Model fitting and learning
The learning set used for model fitting is generated by using
third party sub-domain nodes in the WideGraph. We removed
from the learning set all sub-domains with in-degree of domain
less than 3. This is motivated by the structural hole theory
fact that if an object only exists in one first-party website, it
might be considered to be directly related to its father first-
party objects. Since some websites have at least two domain
names or one of them is part of another website we consider
only the sub-domains with in-degree of domain greater than 2,
e.g., geforce.com calls nvidia.com/*/geforce and many of the
third party of geforce.com and nvidia.com are the same. These
removed sub-domains might also be AdTrackers that have
been seen only a single time but it’s clear that an object used by
at most two websites doesnt bring a critical privacy threat [48].
However, they will be considered when they become more
visible. This filtering step removed 14394 sub-domains out
the 33372 potentially third party sub-domains we had initially
in the WideGraph. We therefore have 18979 sub-domains node
that remains. We select 80% of the nodes as the learning set
and put aside the remaining 20% for evaluation.
We labelled the learning set with labels coming from the
application of most popular filter list2: Easy List [11], Easy
Privacy [12], Squid Blacklist [42], Fanboy’s Social Blocking
List [16] and Fanboy’s Annoyance List [15]. These filter lists
include more than 100K rules to distinguish whether a URL
is an AdTracker. We did not try to separate advertisement site
from trackers. We label a sub-domain as ”AdTrackers”, if at
least one of URLs belonging to this sub-domain have been
blocked by the filter lists.
The Random Forest model is therefore fitted by giving for
each potential third-party sub-domain in the learning set a vec-
tor 1061 of its attributes: 1000 keywords resulting from content
features, 5 engineered features and 56 structural features
extracted from the WideGraph including direct and indirect
coverage. This feature vectors generated by aggregating the
features of all interaction URLs that are within that sub-
domain. We show the results of the fitted Random Forest tree
in the next section.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we report and analyze the results of our
trained classifier. First, we analyze most important features to
that enrich our representation to detect ad/tracker sub-domains.
Second, we examine the results of our classifier.
A. Feature Analysis
We first present an preliminary analysis of the features we
are using for classification. We begin by looking at total degree
of a node. We show in Fig. 6 for each value of degree the
proportion of sub-domains that are labelled as AdTracker and
2We have used the adblockparser tool to label the URLs [3]
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Non-AdTrackers. As can be seen a larger proportion of sub-
domains of global degree less than 10 are in the non AdTracker
group while the proportion inverses for degree larger than 10.
However the plot also shows that the overall degree is not
discriminative enough as 20% of very high degree nodes are
still in the non-tracker category.
We show in Fig. 7 the Complementary Cumulative Distribu-
tion Function (CCDF) of the direct coverage obtained over the
two class of sub-domains. As can be seen the direct coverage
have a much more discriminant power than the overall degree.
For example only 0.38% of non-AdTrackers have a direct
coverage larger than 0.01, while 3% of AdTrackers have such
a direct coverage. But this is still not as a large proportion of
AdTracker have direct coverage that are small.
We also show in Fig. 8 the average percentage of occurrence
of the keywords with largest TF-IDF in AdTracker and non
AdTracker group. As can be seen some keyword are more
prevalent in AdTrackers but they are also present in relatively
large percentage of non-AdTrackers sub domains.
The analysis of individual features show that each have
some discriminant power but no one of them can be used
a simple decision metric. This is why we need to go to more
complex machine learning mechanisms in order to combine
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these different feature in order to be able to detect AdTrackers.
B. Classification results
We trained the Random Forest model with the 15183 sub-
domains in the training set. Each sub-domain was transformed
into an array of 1061 features as explained above. The random
was set to use 250 trees. The training set contained 58% of
AdTracker labelled entries and 42% of non-AdTracker labeled
one. The training was done using the python scikit-learn toolkit
and took less than 2 minutes to be completed on a single CPU
core of a laptop. This is to compare with around 15 mins over
a server with 4 cores for calibrating the Deep Neural Network
that we are not describing here because of space limitation.
We thereafter applied the resulting Random Forest model to
our evaluation set containing 3796 sub-domains. We present
the obtained result in Table I. Before going further we clarify
the definition of false positives and false negatives.
• False positives: the Random Forest classifier predicts that
a particular sub-domain is an AdTrackers, while the filter
lists have labelled it as not AdTrackers.
• False negatives: the Random Forest classifier predicts
that a particular sub-domain is not an AdTrackers, while
the filter lists labelled it as AdTrackers.
With these definitions we can calculate for each class of
sub-domains a precision and a recall value resulting into a
confusion matrix. A global performance average, and a global
accuracy for the classifier are also can be calculated.
Another important point is relative to the way of calculat-
ing the performance parameters. The popularity of different
domain in the Alexa 10K domain is different, meaning that in
the normal operation of a browser some domain will repeat
more frequently that some other. moreover, the prevalence of
AdTrackers have also large variation with some, like google
analytic and ad services, appearing much more frequently
that that some less used trackers. When we calculate the
performance over the flow of incoming websites, we are
introducing a bias related to the difference in popularity and
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prevalence of first domains and AdTracker, i.e., the impact
on performance of detecting correctly a popular AdTracker
is much higher than detecting a more anecdotal one. An less
bias approach will consist of giving the same weight to all
sub-domains, whether they are popular or not, and to evaluate
the performance over all potential AdTrackers rather than
doing it over the set of trackers observed during a browsing
experience. Unfortunately almost all papers in the literature
adopt the first approach, rather the less biased and more correct
second approach. The result of this practice that the high
level performance reported in the literature are difficult to
interpret and to compare, as we do not know if the very good
performance is resulting from the popularity bias, or from the
real good performance of the classifier. Moreover, using the
second approach will let to lower classification performance.
In this paper we decided to report both performance metrics:
the biased one and the unbiased. We show in Table I-a, the
biased performance and show that we have been able to obtain
99.2% precision on AdTrackers observed during our crawling
experience with the Alexa 10K top sites, and we achieved
an average accuracy of 96.1%. These value are very much
aligned with other performance reported in the literature, in
particular recent state of the art papers [8], [26], [41]. However
we report also in Table I-b, the unbiased performance we
obtain. As expected this performance is less than the biased
one. Nevertheless, we achieve 87.2% of accuracy over all sub-
domains.
We did a review of false positives cases, where the Random
Forest was predicting an AdTracker and the filter list were
not. Among these 220 false positive case we found 138 sub-
domains (62% of false positives) that are in fact trackers
that have not been detected by filter lists. Meaning that the
Random Forest model detected some new trackers compared
to filter list. This validate the usability of our methodology to
update automatically filter list after. After correcting the labels
of these trackers we recalculated the performance and show
it in table I-c. The corrected performance is now 90.9% of
accuracy and 96.6% precision for AdTrackers. We did also an
analysis of the false negatives sub-domains and observer that
they were all with low popularity and have been referred by a
limited number of other trackers. Our works can be extended
to handle some of these sub-domains by adding new features
from JavaScript APIs, and perceptual based features [43] as
well.
V. RELATED WORKS
Many researchers are currently engaged in designing ad
and trackers detectors using machine learning techniques. In
this section we review these research work in the following
sections.
A. HTTP-Based Approaches
These approaches try to find HTTP-based patterns to clas-
sify ad and trackers. For example, Bhagavatula et al. [7] used
characteristics of the structure of the URL to train a machine
that classifies ad-related URLs from non ad-related URLs. As
TABLE I: Classification Result
Precision Recall
Ad/Tracker Class 99.2% 95.5%
Non-Ad/Tracker Class 88.9% 97.8%
Macro Avg 94.0% 96.7%
Accuracy 96.1%
(a)
Precision Recall
Ad/Tracker Class 90.2% 87.7%
Non-Ad/Tracker Class 83.3% 86.6%
Macro Avg 86.8% 87.1%
Accuracy 87.2%
(b)
Precision Recall
Ad/Tracker Class 96.6% 88.4%
Non-Ad/Tracker Class 83.3% 94.9%
Macro Avg 90.0% 91.7%
Accuracy 90.9%
(c)
a result, the features mostly include lexical based features
and keywords. They show that their approach outperforms the
filter-lists and it can find new ads that already have not been
in the black list of the filter-lists. Gugelmann et al. [20] used
HTTP traffic traces attributes like the size and the number
of HTTP requests to train a machine learning model which
classifies ads and analytic services. They evaluated their model
on real traffic traces of a campus network and found new
privacy-intrusive services. Yu et al. [51] also analyzed HTTP
requests and used a method to find tracker domains by looking
for the third party objects that receive similar unique patterns
from a large number of first parties.
B. JavaScript Approaches
Since lots of third party services use JavaScripts, many
researchers have tried to detect and analyze third party services
by extracting features from JavaScripts. In this approach, static
JavaScript codes have been analysed separately or along with
other features related to JavaScript access to train a model
that distinguishes between tracker and non tracker JavaScripts.
In [23], Ikram et al. used supervised machine learning by
using syntactic and semantic features from JavaScript files to
predict that a JavaScript is malicious or not. Wu et al. [48]
used machine learning to classify whether a JavaScript code
unit is tracking related or not. Also they identified HTTP
requests generated by the third-party tracking JavaScript. In
[27], Kaizer and Gupta trained a classifier with features related
to JavaScript access, cookie access, and URL information to
detect machine based trackers. While these approaches achieve
high-grade accuracy, most of them are not robust against
obfuscation techniques [49], [50], [28].
C. Extended Approaches
In order to increase accuracy and robustness, researches
used multiple types of objects. For example, Cozza et al.
proposed a hybrid method that used both machine learning
and filter-lists if an ad/tracker is new or not [8]. They applied
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their model on JavaScript and HTTP requests. Authors in
[6] used HTML and HTTP information to building a graph
of resource-hosting domains from Document Object Model
(DOM) hierarchy of each website. They leverage machine
learning to classifies web tracking domains. In [26], Iqbal et
al. propose Adgraph and design a ML classifier that take as
input the structural and content features of it for each website
individually. Authors in [41] extend the Adgraph work by
adding perceptual classifier to generate rules to update filter
lists for under-served regions (non-English regions). This is
similar to our approach as we also use an offline process to
find more hidden trackers from a larger perspective to update
the filter lists.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first try to
comprehensively collect and analyze the interactions between
the objects on web pages on large scale to detect hidden ads
and trackers. As our evaluations have shown, we are able to
find ads and trackers that we had never seen before in training
set.
VI. CONCLUSION
Third-party tracker services are very dynamic and may
change their behavior repeatedly. So this circumstance leads
to most previous works became vulnerable, especially the
ones that are only based on URLs pattern or code analysis.
In this paper we present a holistic approach that considers
conventional features, such as URLs and Javascripts’ contents,
and the behavior of the third parties which serve the top
10K Alexa’s websites. In contrast to the most state-of-the-art
machine learning approaches in this area in which a separate
dependency graph is constructed and analyzed for individual
websites, our proposed method builds a large scale WideGraph
by properly merging the dependency graphs of individual
websites. Using WideGraph, we can encode the third parties’
specific roles in the whole network into structural (graph-
based) features. Using strong content and structural features,
we have trained a Random Forest model to classify third party
nodes into tracker and non-tracker categories. The resulted
classifier has showed high degree of robustness to dynamic
behavior of third party nodes, reached to 96.1% biased and
90.9% unbiased accuracy, and uncovered hundreds of new
trackers that are not hit by filter-lists at the time of this writing.
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